Mao Zedong was President of the Chinese Soviet Republic. But he was not really in charge. The central party, centered around Wang Ming and the 28 Bolsheviks from the Comintern controlled the Communist Party of China and the Red Army. They took steps that Mao didn’t agree with, and he was pushed out from their inner circle.
The Bolsheviks weren’t satisfied with the initial land redistribution. That had essentially made everyone a middle peasant. But the Communist purists didn’t want to end with many rural farmers with private land. A Land Investigation Movement began to see if there were any budding landlords or rich peasants who still had land. It was easy to define someone as rich if the thresholds were set low enough.
An issue, even before land redistribution, was that a vast majority of the population in the Chinese countryside possessed landholdings totaling less than ten mu, which is about one and half acres. In the case of Fujian Province, landlords on average held 7.47 mu of land per member of the household. That meant that a landlord owing an acre of land could be a class enemy. That was above the subsistence level of two to three mu, but far removed from the vast feudal manors of medieval Europe.
The issue was not simply that some landlords profited off others. Another issue, which the redistribution did not fix was the large rural Chinese population and the limited land per person. Land redistribution equalized the amount of land available for farming per person. But that new plot was still small. The rural population was simply so large. There were almost no large estates to break up. In some cases, it was just taking land from families with few mouths to feed and dividing it among families with more children. The result of land redistribution was that virtually everyone now farmed around the subsistence level.
The Communist Party leadership sought a socialist revolution, not the creation of a rural society of peasant smallholders who cherished private property. To the leadership any inequality in landholdings, however small, suggested that poor peasants were being exploited. That must mean that feudal forces, such as landlords and rich peasants were blunting the impact of the revolution and preventing a more thorough equalization of wealth.
The Communist Party undertook a Land Investigation Movement designed to uncover and destroy all remnants of landlord and rich peasant influence. Eventually, these radical policies drove it to attack practically anyone in possession of private property, including those who had originally supported or accepted the land redistribution. The previously poorest peasants were grateful for the Party’s help and supported the revolution. But in the Chinese Soviet Republic, everyone else’s support for the party was weakening.
And there was an alternative for those who did not want to live under Communist leadership. The Nationalist government in Nanjing had long been planning the encirclement and destruction of the Chinese Soviets.
The Nationalists had already tried four unsuccessful encirclement campaigns. Each time, the Communists had defeated them using the strategy of Lure Them in Deep.
The communists relied on luring government forces into areas under Communist control and engaging them on its own terms. Prior to military action it would strengthen its defenses and clear the fields. That meant evacuating most civilians from the area and leaving only the most ardent Communists who would provide no information on the Red Army or provide misinformation. The Communists also removed any food or livestock of which the government troops could use and destroyed critical infrastructure like roads and bridges.
Because all foodstuffs and most people had been removed from the combat area, KMT soldiers were without food, supplies, and intelligence.
The government troops then had to rely on long supply lines vulnerable to guerrilla attacks. Cut off from supply centers, KMT forces often searched in vain for supplies and exposed themselves to counterattack. One KMT prisoner recalled that they had gone days without food and that even when they got food, they could not find cooking implements or firewood. They sometimes had to eat uncooked rice. The stresses from long marching and poor sleep resulted in many of the government troops getting sick.
The KMT units had high rates of attrition, some of them losing as many as half of their members. The prisoner recalled that the men in his unit often said, “If the enemy doesn’t kill us, exhaustion or disease will.” The KMT forces that were not defeated retreated to areas of government control.
Up to 1933, the KMT had tried several strategies. It would advance into Communist held areas and capture major towns or cities and then radiate outward in search of Red Army units. They adopted guerilla tactics and would wait for KMT units to split up and then launch a surprise attack, using familiarity with the terrain and geography to rout government forces.
The Red Army and its supporters made life for the Nationalist army difficult and time-consuming. For example, KMT forces would set up camp for the night. Then Communist forces would open fire with large, loud cannons on the camp. KMT forces directed machine-gun fire toward what they thought were Communist positions but would remain firmly within their encampment. In the morning, the Communist troops would retreat to a nearby hill or mountain as the KMT sent a few small units out in search of the Red Army. Unable to locate any of them and concerned that they were being surrounded, the KMT forces would usually retreat to areas under KMT control. Also, when government forces were marching they were often the targets of far-off sniper fire. At other times red flags would appear in the distance and the KMT, not knowing whether they were small local forces or large Red Army force, would give chase. The KMT forces were led in deep and found nothing as the Red forces disappeared into the mountains and forests.
These tactics, combined with the strategy of evacuating civilians deemed unreliable into the heart of the Chinese Soviet Republic allowed the Communist Party to enjoy complete control over the civilian population from 1930 to 1933.
The Nationalists also had to deal with other enemies, like rebelling warlords and the invading Japanese. So, frustrated, the Nationalist armies eventually retreated during the first four encirclement campaigns.
However, the Fifth Encirclement and Suppression Campaign of 1933 and 1934 was very different. Mao Zedong, long the principal advocate of guerilla warfare and luring the KMT into Communist controlled areas, lost power and influence. Military command was under the control of the Comintern and the central party executives, and particularly a German military advisor to the Communists named Otto Braun.
On the Nationalist side, the KMT and its supreme military leader Chiang Kai-shek had learned from the earlier encirclement campaigns. The fifth campaign, Chiang declared would be “Three Parts Military, Seven Parts Political”. This is also sometimes called the New Life Movement. Chiang’s wife, Soong Meiling, played an important role in that political campaign which praised a life of four virtues. Writing to an American magazine, in English since she had studied in the USA, Meiling stated that "the mere accumulation of great wealth is not sufficient to enable China to resume her position as a great nation." There must be, she continued, "also revival of the spirit, since spiritual values transcend mere material riches.” Chiang on his side declared that "If we do not weed the present body of corruption, bribery, perfunctoriness, and ignorance, and establish instead a clean, effective administration, the day will soon come when the revolution will be started against us as we did the Manchus".
Today, Xi Jinping has warned Chinese society and the Communist Party against similar vices, like corruption, displaying obvious wealth, and effeminate men.
In the New Life Movement of the 1930s, the official, educated and wealthy classes were to lead the people by example. This followed a traditional Confucian belief that "The virtue of the gentleman is like wind; the virtue of the commoner is like grass. Let the wind blow over the grass and it is sure to bend." Meiling’s sister Qingling, the Communist supporter, criticized the New Life Movement as window dressing.
But Chiang Kai-shek had travelled to the Soviet Union before the Northern Expedition and had been profoundly impacted by what he saw. In his words, "The poor were told it was right to rob the rich; employees were encouraged to betray or even kill their employers; children were urged to denounce their parents. These 'struck at all the fundamental principles' of traditional Chinese ethics.” His views were a mixture of Confucian and Methodist Christian notions of self-cultivation and correct living. It prescribed proper etiquette on every aspect of daily life and was part of Sun Yat-sen’s principle of the people's livelihood, according to Chiang.
Virtuous gentry but never local bullies or evil gentry were to be the government representatives in the Movement. The regulations forbade anyone accused of “the conduct of local bullies and evil gentry” from holding a leadership role in the campaign.
But to critics, it sidestepped the issue of tenancy and failed to reduce the tax burden on the people. Rural credit was the only thing that the Nationalists dealt with in any appreciable way during the time they were battling the Chinese Soviet Republic.
For the military part of the Fifth Encirclement Campaign, a new tactic was developed. Fortified block houses were built. Their construction was personally supervised by Chiang Kai-shek. The KMT undertook a massive expansion of fortifications and checkpoints throughout the Chinese countryside intended to strangle the Soviets. In all, more than fourteen thousand of these were constructed and were intended to be manned by local militia. New roads and communication networks through Jiangxi were built to help with logistics and supplies.
This time the approach would be “advancing slowly and consolidating at every step” and “advancing steadily and striking sure blows”.
Supplies for them were gathered from local communities, which produced no end of problems for civilians in areas under KMT control. The KMT “borrowed” supplies from local populations and drove up the price of food.
The labor for building the fortifications and the money used to pay for their maintenance were extracted from the local community in the form of a head tax and a 30 percent levy on rice and great amounts of conscripted labour.
As part of the New Life Movement, all soldiers in the KMT were to receive political indoctrination. There were punishments for embezzlement, gambling, desertion, smoking opium, not providing backup in a timely manner, inappropriate relations with minors under 21, frequenting prostitutes, and the theft of military property. Another was “insufficient effort in bandit suppression”. But only rarely were soldiers punished for injuring civilians or abusing civilians. Soldiers requisitioned civilian homes, took crops and livestock and forced merchants to sell them goods at depressed prices. The KMT army had not yet incorporated alliance building with civilians into its DNA as the Red Army tried.
Just as the KMT established blockhouses throughout areas under its control, so too did the Communist Party. Under Otto Braun’s leadership, Red Army units were instructed to garrison their own version of blockhouses and create supporting points and adopted a tactic that called for making a series of “short, swift thrusts”.
The Red Army this time would hold the territory of the Chinese Soviet Republic, build blockhouses, ditches, and defensive structures and engage the enemy only when he was within easy striking distance and not pursue if he fled. The Red Army soldiers that survived recalled that the blockhouses, often made of earthen bricks, were sitting targets for KMT air assaults and provided no protection to the soldiers manning them. One veteran asked in retrospect “how could have ‘blockhouses’ made of wood and sandstone held up against bombardment by artillery?”
The adoption of conventional tactics brought about a shift in how the Communists gathered and deployed resources. Previously dispersed Red units were concentrated, as were their supplies. Building large, conventional forces and establishing blockhouses required an incredible number of resources and the Soviet government sucked the countryside dry, mobilizing as much manpower and as many supplies as it could. Local militia and armed forces were folded into conventional units, concentrating all the Red military strength on the front lines.
The result was catastrophic for the Reds. Large units were concentrated and thrown into battle against KMT units for cities and towns. As Red Army soldiers fell on the front lines, Soviet local defense militias were drafted to the front. This time, the KMT could bring the full power of its conventional forces to bear against the outnumbered Red Army. The KMT eliminated Red Army forces garrisoned in major cities along the outer edge of the Soviet Republic, and by the end of 1934, most major Red Army units had been defeated in battle or had departed on the Long March.
As KMT armies made their way into the Soviet Republic in the second half of 1934, there were widespread defections from the Communist list of class enemies. The Communists attempted to stem the tide of defections by instituting a “Red Terror”. This strategy produced widespread violence against civilians and even more defections. The extent of the problem is evident in the Legal Procedures of the Chinese Soviet Republic, promulgated in April 1934.
In that new law, district-level authorities no longer needed the permission of their superiors before the arrest, trial, sentencing, and punishment of “counterrevolutionaries.” Authorities at the lowest levels of the Soviet Republic government, “with the agreement of the masses” (which meant the consent of the Poor Peasant Leagues) were now allowed to dispense revolutionary justice. In areas taken back by the Communists, local authorities could, with the consent of the masses, put “local bullies,” “evil gentry,” and landlords to death. They were instructed to report the execution to higher officials after the sentence was carried out.
With that new legal code, the Communists made it a deadly crime to collaborate with or defect to the KMT. Refusal to pay Communist taxes or levies, insubordination, desertion from the Red Army, or refusal to sell goods at Communist mandated prices were now all to be punished by death and without seeking permission at higher levels in the party.
A local government in the southern part of the Soviet Republic wrote to the Red Army soldiers that they should “Carry out a Red Terror. Swiftly capture and kill all counterrevolutionaries, suppress all counterrevolutionaries in Soviet areas. Kill those who spread rumors and create disturbances! Kill those who serve as the enemy’s spies! Kill those who assassinate and sabotage the revolution! Kill those who lead others to defect!”
Less than one month later, on May 23, 1934, a senior Chinese Communist leader issued a directive titled “On the Organization of Landlords and Rich Peasants into Hard Labor Brigades and the Confiscation and Requisition of Property.” In it he stated that “Landlords are to be organized into permanent hard labor brigades and rich peasants should be organized into temporary labor brigades.” In war zones, landlords and rich peasants were drafted into the same labor brigade. Any landlords or rich peasants engaging in counterrevolutionary activities were to be killed on the spot, all their property and possessions confiscated, and their dependents expelled from the Chinese Soviet Republic or moved elsewhere within it. Rich peasants were to have their grain and cash requisitioned.
Two days later, he added that all counterrevolutionary activities should be addressed in the swiftest manner possible. Any local bullies and evil gentry, landlords, rich peasants, merchants, capitalists, managers, and vagrants should be immediately arrested and their leaders subject to intense investigation. The rest should not be subject to detailed interrogation and should be killed on the spot. If someone is suspected of a counterrevolutionary crime they should be arrested and killed on the spot. Those who have committed minor offenses can be imprisoned. If workers or peasants are leading such activities, they, too, should be killed on the spot. This truly was a Red Terror at the end of the Chinese Soviet Republic as its territory shrunk.
Those classified as landlords and rich peasants were pressed into hard labor brigades and any remaining land and possessions confiscated, down to “every last piece of grain and every last copper coin. As for the wellbeing of those concerned, requisitioning rich peasant grain may create difficulties for rich peasants, but [under the present circumstances] it is beneficial that landlords and rich peasants go hungry to ensure that the Red Army has enough food and does not go hungry or that the families of Red Army soldiers in the rear have enough food and do not experience hardship.”
Not surprisingly, organized mass flight to KMT areas and collaboration with KMT forces increased.
In this Fifth Encirclement campaign, civilians this time actively assisted the KMT. A KMT commander noted that the attitude of civilians changed from one of fear to one of cooperation after the start of the Fifth Campaign. On the ground, civilians acted as guides for the Nationalist military, helped them locate both Red Army forces and Communist cadres in the villages. When the Nationalists arrived in formerly Communist areas, civilians welcomed them, sometimes enthusiastically. The purges that took place within the Communist Party, combined with the mass killings, also drove Red Army commanders and soldiers to defect to the KMT.
A Communist politician complained that defections became common. “There is not one district unaffected and the situation is very serious; mass flight is [not spontaneous], but organized.” The reaction from local authorities, he noted, was usually to send armed squads after those attempting to flee and kill them on the spot, producing numerous mass graves that would later be uncovered by the KMT and its allies.
When KMT forces occupied practically the entire Communist Soviet Republic at the end of 1934, they began the task of organizing local communities into units led by good gentry and establishing local militia that were designed to defend fortified villages against Communist infiltration or counterattack. The burden for paying for these fell squarely on the peasants, but rather than seek out the Communists, they complied as they sought defense against the Communists. Traditional social structures returned to the area. Land was returned to former owners.
By late 1934 and early 1935, the old regime had been restored and reinforced in the countryside.
The outcome of the KMT’s Fifth Encirclement Campaign seemed like a dream come true. The Nationalist government located its enemies, engaged them in conventional battle, and thoroughly routed them, and all the while received help from the local population. It was a crushing defeat for the Chinese Communists and by the end of 1934 the Communist Party was no longer in possession of the Soviet Republic territory and its forces were on the run.
Mao was later able to put the blame on this defeat on Wang Ming and the 28 Bolsheviks. The defeat of the Chinese Soviet Republic allowed Mao to further rise to power.
But first, there would be a Long March.
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