China at the time of the Northern Expedition

The Comintern was betting both on a Northern Warlord and on the KMT

Last time, I mentioned the assassination of the Guomindang’s Liao Zhongkai.  Hu Hanmin’s cousin was implicated.  As a result, Hu who was a long-time revolutionary ally of the late Sun Yat-sen retired from the Nationalist’s Executive Committee.  Hu went to Moscow for 6 months.  He represented his party and awaited the next meeting of the Comintern.  In each of his speeches he always stressed the primary role of the KMT party in China’s National Revolution and never mentioned China’s Communist Party.  He also submitted an application for China’s Nationalist Party to join the Comintern as representative of China.  The Soviet revolutionary founder Vladimir Lenin was dead.  The KMT’s application was supported by one Russian leader, Zinoviev, but undermined by Stalin.  As a result of that and his trip in general, Hu was able to observe what was happening in Moscow in the late 1925 and early 1926 period.

Hu had previously supported Borodin (Grusenberg)’s reorganization of the KMT.  He knew his party needed it.  Now Hu, returning from Moscow, told confidants that though the Communists said it was a Dictatorship of the Proletariat, meaning the workers, in reality it was the dictatorship by the Communist Party.  And furthermore, it was a dictatorship by one man and his clique in that party.  Stalin was consolidating his power now that Lenin was dead and other revolutionaries like Zinoviev and Leon Trotsky were becoming an opposition within the Communist Party in the Soviet Union.

Hu believed that the Comintern was deliberately misleading the Nationalists in China.  He now believed the Comintern did not truly want world revolution among the oppressed peoples of the world as equals, but under the control of Moscow.  The Comintern would always prefer its proxy, the Communist Party of China over the Nationalist Party, he believed.  Hu was starting to see what others in the KMT would later call the Soviet’s Red Imperialism.  A new Soviet style imperialism towards the colonial and semi-colonial countries of the world to conduct revolution only under the supervision and direction of Moscow.

Hu returned to China after six months in Russia on a boat to southern China that also carried Grusenberg who now had to deal with the aftermath of Chiang’s cryptic coup. 

But when Hu returned in the spring of 1926, Chiang was not ready to follow Hu’s recommendations and to turn against the Communists or Comintern.  Chiang might have agreed with Hu, but Chiang wanted Communist and Soviet support for his Northern Expedition.

Sun Yat-sen had twice wanted to launch a Northern Expedition (sometimes called a Northward Expedition) to unite China under his leadership.  Once had been in 1921 and another just before his cancer diagnosis in 1925.  Now Sun Yat-sen had died, Chiang was Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Army, had trained a Nationalist Army at the Whampoa Military Academy and was planning a northern campaign to expand the Nationalist Government and hopefully unite the country under the Nationalists. For this, he wanted and needed as much support as he could find.  The Communists and the Soviets were in Chiang’s mind, necessary allies at this time.

Not all Communists were keen on supporting Chiang Kai-shek and the Northern Expedition.  Chen Duxiu, the first Chairman of the Communist Party wanted Communists to leave the KMT after the spring 1926 coup.  But Grusenberg (Borodin) calmed him down and insisted, on behalf of the Comintern, that the Communists stay within the KMT. 

The membership of the Communist Party of China had been growing.  By its Fourth Congress in January 1925, it had 980 members.  By some counts, the KMT had 200,000 members at the same time.  By the spring of 1927, following the Northern Expedition, Communist Party membership had ballooned to 57,000.

When Chiang announced the launch of the Northern Expedition on July 1, 1926, the Nationalist Army, also known as the National Revolutionary Army, had about 100,000 soldiers.  The other governors and warlords of China had perhaps 1 million soldiers, or 10 times the Nationalist number.

But in this case, the Nationalists were more cohesive than the various cliques and independent leaders in the rest of China.  One factor to keep in mind, is that the warlord armies were often organized through levels of personal loyalty.  Highest ranking warlords relied on the support of commanders below them.  Those lower-level officials commanded the personal loyalty of their troops.  Sometimes overall loyalty was secure, through long-standing relationships. But often it was insecure and subordinates could not be counted on.  There are countless examples of disloyalty and backstabbing among commanders during the warlord era.  Any force that was cohesive, disciplined and united could have an advantage facing off against a loose confederacy of soldiers more interested in their future prospects than in fighting a losing battle.

Wu Peifu was head of the Zhili Clique’s armies.  Cao Kun of the same group had been disgraced after his corrupt and visible vote buying for the Presidency and then loss of that role in a coup d’état.  Wu had control of Henan and Hubei, while his subordinate Tang Shengzhi was in charge in Hunan.  Their allies controlled Sichuan, Yunnan and Guizhou.  Together, they had about 250,000 soldiers.

Sun Chuanfang controlled the four provinces of the Lower Yangzi River, which included the Shanghai area, as well as the coastal province of Fujian.  At its peak, that army had about 200,000 combatants.

The Model Governor Yan Xishan was in control of Shanxi, as mentioned in my tour of the region in 1921 during that recent episode.

Zhang Zuolin, the Manchurian Warlord, still held his traditional territory, as well as much of Zhili and Shandong and commanded 300,000 troops.

The Christian Warlord Feng Yuxiang would soon return from Moscow.  For now, his National People’s Army was commanded by a subordinate and controlled an area north and northwest of Beijing with at least 100,000 men-at-arms.  I have read both the 100,000 and 300,000 figures for him, with 300,000 being the maximum he had in 1925 before some unsuccessful battles against the Manchurians.  It was Feng who had led the coup that had removed Cao Kun from the Presidency.  But Zhang Zuolin and Duan Qirui had forced him to retreat and the Japanese allied Beijing and Manchurian regimes were a threat to Soviet interests and the Chinese Eastern Railway which connected Siberia and Vladivostok. 

The USSR’s national interests made them seek an alliance with a north China warlord.  Among their reasons had been a fear that the KMT would split following Sun Yat-sen’s death.

Feng is often known as the Christian Warlord.  So it should be no surprise that in the long run, the alliance between a Christian Warlord and the atheist USSR did not work out.  But each tried.  Feng needed a supplier of weapons when other countries were not offering them.  He had no arsenals in his territory.  And his base in northern China, next to Soviet backed Mongolia made it possible to travel back and forth for communication and supplies.  However, he resented Soviet backtracking on promises they had made to renounce old Czarist claims on China.  The USSR intervened in Mongolia and Manchuria, much to Chinese nationalists’ displeasure.  Feng was among those who considered Soviets to be conniving with bad intentions towards traditional Chinese spheres of influence.  He used their weapons and engineers but tried to keep their political instructors far away from his troops.  His commanders also refused to take orders from the Soviets and the Red Army veterans weren’t used to not being obeyed.

Feng had not been the USSR’s first choice for a warlord ally. They had tried Zhang Zuolin of Manchuria and they had temporarily come to an agreement for joint management of the railway, splitting profits.  But Zhang was closer to the Japanese and that was a problem for the Soviets.

The USSR had reached out to Wu Peifu, as well.  But his crushing of the Communist backed railway strike mentioned here before was an issue.  Even such anti-communist activities by the warlord did not stop the Soviet Union from still trying to get his support.  In the end, it was Wu who refused a deal.  The Soviet Communists had been negotiating with the warlord even after his strike breaking.

They were able to work out a deal with Feng Yuxiang in 1925.  But it never worked very well and was over by 1927.  Feng will play an important role in the Northern Expedition, so I’ll introduce him more fully now.

Feng was born in a poor peasant family of Zhili province in 1882. His father was in the army. Feng’s family sometimes was without food.   Yuxiang attended school for three months, and later spent one more year in school. This was all of his formal education. Aged ten, he enlisted in the army and became part of Yuan Shikai’s New Army.  In Manchuria he suppressed bandit gangs and studied independently to compensate for his lack of schooling.

In 1911, Feng Yuxiang joined the revolutionary movement and barely escaped execution by the Qing by the intervention of his uncle, Lu Jianzhang – one of Yuan Shikai’s most trusted followers.  He temporarily resigned but in 1913 became a regiment commander.  When Yuan Shikai was proclaimed as new emperor, Feng’s troops were sent to Sichuan to suppress the anti-Yuan National Protection Army.  But instead, he made a secret agreement with the rebels.

When Zhang Xun, tried to restore the last Emperor Puyi to the throne, Feng and his troops played an important role in expelling Zhang Xun’s soldiers from Beijing.

Feng was interested in Christianity since 1906, when a missionary doctor cured his disease but refused to accept any payment. Feng joined a Bible study, and eventually found Christianity to be an effective way of fighting alcohol and opium abuse and maintaining morality. In 1911 Feng was baptized at the Methodist Episcopal Church in Beijing. He became known as the “Christian general,” and tried to spread the faith in his army. For Feng, spreading the faith was a way of strengthening the morality of his troops. Feng tried converting his officers to Christianity, thereby reinforcing their loyalty to him.

He supported the May Fourth movement and was sincerely a patriot. In Hunan province where his troops were then stationed, students boycotted Japanese goods and even attacked Japanese shops. The commander of a Japanese warship threatened to send marines to protect Japanese citizens, Feng ordered his soldiers to guard Japanese-owned shops to protect them, prohibiting anyone, including the Japanese, to enter or leave them. Effectively, he shut down Japanese businesses without giving Japan a reason to intervene.

Feng was known for his quality troops and for the humane way he treated them. He took care of his soldiers and their families. In 1920 when drought struck Hebei, Feng gave special leave and money to any Hebei native who wanted to go home to help their families. In 1923 a family, whose son was killed in battle received funds and a letter of condolence from the command of the National Peoples’ Army. In the other armies, families were lucky to be notified about soldier’s death.  Compensation was not normal.

Discipline in his First National People’s Army was very strict, especially in comparison with the Second and the Third National People’s Armies under the control of his warlord allies, and the armies of other warlords. As Soviet reports testify, desertion, pillaging, and brutality against the local population were very rare. Feng’s army did not admit bandits though it was common practice in other armies. Commanders paid attention to soldiers’ needs and enjoyed popularity among them.

Feng paid special attention to the training and education of his army. He required all his soldiers to take part in heavy physical training which included boxing, gymnastics, swimming and exhausting route marches.  He often joined in.  Field training often took place in difficult weather conditions. Requirements were equally strict for both soldiers and officers. Officers had to pass physical training examinations and were rewarded or punished according to their results.

Feng’s care for his soldiers compensated the harsh training and discipline. As one of the Soviet advisers noted in his report, Feng was a soldier himself, born in a poor family, and knew the psychology of a soldier and his hardship. Feng always ate food with his soldiers and trained with them in the field. His speeches, which understood and appealed to the soldier’s state of mind, made his troops believe in him. Feng knew the names of a great number of his soldiers. He visited sick ones, helped them, always ensured that they were well fed. He would also cancel punishment for those who were working hard, or who were sick or hungry. Feng even gave money for them to send home and to pay for their weddings and funerals.

Most of his recruits were illiterate but learned how to read in his army. Junior officers were, according to the memoirs of the head of Soviet advisers in Feng Yuxiang’s army, “semi-literate peasant boys”. Feng organized workshops to teach different trades to soldiers and officers, so they could support themselves in case they got dismissed or wounded. Such training also kept them from becoming bandits since they could earn a living outside of the army.

Feng started his program of moral improvement – not only for his army, but also for local people. He investigated opium smoking, gambling and prostitution in the local area. He then arrested opium dealers and confiscated their opium stocks. He ordered the closure of all brothels, despite this making him lose revenue, the tax on prostitution. But the morality of his army was more important.

The atheist Communists made a bet on the Christian warlord and lost.  They were never a good fit.  But later Chiang Kai-shek would win his support, for a time.

Please join us next time for The Northern Expedition.