The War of the Central Plains

The Bloodiest and Last of the Warlord Wars

Much was happening in different parts of China after the Northern Expedition.

Mao and the remaining Chinese Communists were mostly in the hills on the borders between provinces.  Exiles from Wuhan were in Moscow and Europe.  The Nanjing Government was trying to assert control.  Warlords were preserving their armies and territorial jurisdictions as best they could.  Japan was eyeing eastern China.  Each will play a role going forward. 

Last time, I discussed how China had been trending towards decentralization since the Taiping Rebellion.  There were strong local and provincial armies.  Their strongest leaders were often called warlords. 

The national capital was very weak in the Republic of China period, with little tax revenue and controlling just one army among many.  Think about that for a moment.  Could you imagine if the US government was only one military force among many, barely stronger than other regional armies?  That happened once and it resulted in the 4-year Civil War.  Today, successful nation states only have one army and its always national.  They don’t allow subnational armies that could rebel against the nation state.

Some of Chiang Kai-shek (more commonly called Jiang Jieshi in China)’s first moves as national leader was to try to change this dangerous Chinese situation.  He was facing multiple regional and provincial armies. Their leaders were keeping the tax revenues from those areas, which funded their own armies.  Jiang appointed a governor in Hunan province, who then finally forwarded tax revenue to Nanjing. 

Jiang brought up the issue of demobilization of armies, including his, with his allies from the Northern Campaign.  Jiang explained that China having so many soldiers was far too costly for everyone and that it was just causing the government to go into debt. 

In fact, during the Nanjing Decade, between the Northern Expedition and Japan’s full invasion in 1937, half of the national government’s expenses were for its military and about another 35% on interest on the national debt (which included legacy debt from the Qing Dynasty, the Boxer Rebellion Indemnity and the other governments of the Republic of China).  That left only about 15% for everything else, such as education or road building or industrial development.  Jiang (Chiang) tried to negotiate the number of troops down as a first step to reform.

His former warlord allies, however, did not agree.  They would not shrink their armies without a fight.

One of the first things Chiang (Jiang) did as leader of the Nationalist government was attempt to reorganize and demobilize the armies.  He argued that Germany and Japan were countries that had succeeded with national armies.  He said the government needed to cut costs and focus on building a modern state and nation.  At this time, under all commanders, China had about 2 million soldiers and their salaries and maintenance costs exceeded Nanjing’s total budget by a big margin.  To show his sincerity, he went first and implemented reorganization within the troops he directly controlled. He rotated leaders to make them interchangeable and to highlight the importance of organizational loyalty regardless of who was in charge.  This was different than a system of personal loyalty where soldiers would only fight for someone they were individually loyal to. 

In July 1928, Jiang met with the Christian Warlord, Feng Yuxiang, the Model Governor Yan Xishan and a Guangxi Warlord Li Zongren.  Each of them had been important in the successful Northern Expedition and still controlled armies loyal to each of them.  They agreed in principle to a Plan for Military Reorganization that would result in one national army of 60 divisions under central command, training and discipline.  But then all these military leaders returned to their bases and not much happened. 

Jiang then invited them to a committee to make proposals on how to achieve the plan.  Feng proposed a new structure that would keep his force equal with Jiang’s, with the other two leaders having a strong, but smaller force each.  Yan countered with a plan that would have increased his force’s relative strength.  Clearly Feng and Yan were trying to preserve their armies and to maintain a sufficient strength to maintain their position.

On January 1, 1929, there was a Conference on the topic in Nanjing.  Feng and Yan didn’t trust Jiang and must have believed he wanted to cut their strength while maintaining his own. As a worrying sign of what was to come, both Yan and Feng left the Conference early and returned home.

In February 1929, Li Zongren rebelled by marching his Guangxi army south from Wuhan, where it had been stationed, into Changsha, the capital of Hunan.  He forced out the Governor that Jiang had installed the previous spring.  That meant taxes would no longer be forwarded to Nanjing from that province.  It was a direct attack on the central government’s authority.  Jiang cut off relations with Li and sent soldiers under his subordinate to Wuhan to prepare to remove Li's forces.  Negotiations were attempted by Nanjing but were unsuccessful.  At this time, Feng Yuxiang, the Christian Warlord, allied with Nanjing and assisted with the campaign.  There is no evidence that he received any payment for this service.  Subsequent events show that he may have expected more control in Shandong as a result.  It is also possible that he simply wanted to remove a competitor.

By early April, the attack under Jiang’s orders was successful and Nanjing controlled both Wuhan and Changsha again.  Li went into exile in Hong Kong.

Then in May 1929, Feng also broke with Jiang.  This was after Jiang appointed someone else to occupy land around Jinan and Qingdao in Shandong after the Japanese left.  Feng realized that Jiang would not hand him control of those valuable lands.  Feng’s territories were landlocked, and he craved a port and the revenues that would come from one.  Feng retreated towards Hebei and Shanxi, destroying rail lines as they pulled back.  Then one of Feng’s subordinates publicly demanded Chiang Kai-shek resign and Feng to replace him.  Feng accepted and war became inevitable.  The Guomindang (KMT) ejected Feng from the party.  Jiang appointed two commanders to prepare a multi column advance against Feng.  Also, Jiang was able to turn two of Feng’s supporters and to have them come over to the national side with about 100,000 good soldiers with them.   That deprived Feng of 1/3 of his army.  On May 27^th, Feng reassessed that his chances were poor. He announced his retirement and took refuge with Yan Xishan in Shanxi.

In August 1929, there was another conference on reorganization and demilitarization.  That sparked a new revolt, this time by Zhang Fakui.  He had supported Jiang the previous year against Li and had commanded Nationalist forces in Guangdong.  Now he moved his troops to take control of that province.  Around the same time, Feng’s troops called on Yan Xishan to lead them and for Feng to be his deputy.  They were trying to lure Yan into rebellion by offering him command.  These troops moved east along a railroad preparing to engage Jiang’s troops.  Jiang responded by creating a defensive line in northwest Henan. 

Yan wasn’t willing to jump on the rebels’ side yet and accepted to be Jiang’s deputy commander.  Quickly Feng’s troops were defeated, and Nanjing turned its attention south to deal with the rebellion around Guangdong.  The same general who had taken Wuhan and Changsha for Jiang now advanced on Zhang, defeated him easily and headed west towards Guangxi.  But then a rebellion under a commander named Tang broke out near Zhengzhou, east of Xian by the Yellow River.  Jiang pulled his commander back north to defend against and then defeat this 10,000-troop mutiny.  It worked and in 1929, Jiang had been able to easily handle the rebellions since his opponents were divided. 

But in February 1930, Yan Xishan finally agreed with Feng Yuxiang, who had been his guest for months.  They along with Li and Zhang, who had rebelled the previous year, came together.  They also built a political alliance with Wang Jingwei and one of his close supporters.  This was a serious threat to Jiang.  4 warlords and his old rival in the KMT were uniting against him.  Yan called on Jiang to resign and offered to step down as well.  For two months, there was a telegram war as each side tried to make their message clear.

In May 1930, Yan and Feng agreed on a strategy.  Their armies would move separately in the north with a plan to then link up and attack Nanjing and force Jiang from power.  Yan’s army would advance along a railway to Jinan in Shandong and then on to Nanjing.  A former subcommander of Feng who had defected to Jiang in 1929 returned to the rebels with his troops and supported this push.  Feng’s troops would move east through Henan along railway lines and towards Jiangsu province.  That would get them halfway between Jinan and Nanjing.  This would potentially encircle any Nationalist troops defending Jinan and provide good transportation connections for a push south to Nanjing. 

Jiang decided that Feng was the greater threat and ordered two of his commanders to advance along the railways that Feng wanted to use and push him back and to avoid him linking up with Yan’s army.  There was fierce fighting that carried on for weeks.  Feng had more soldiers, but Jiang’s side had some tanks and airplanes.  Chiang Kai-shek was personally at the front commanding.  Then, Feng’s cavalry attacked an airfield and destroyed multiple Nationalist airplanes.  Little did they know that Jiang was 2 kilometers away with only 200 guards, waiting to board a train at a station.  Had they known and captured the Guomindang leader, history might have turned out very differently. 

Jiang (Chiang) was undeterred and planned a new offensive around Kaifeng with a large army and with heavy artillery.  Feng planned to lure that army into a trap by falling back and then surround the advancing troops.  Aerial reconnaissance showed Jiang an open route to Kaifeng.  But he also intercepted a secret message revealing Feng’s surprise.  Jiang then changed his approach and attacked Feng’s troops directly.  Jiang avoided being encircled, but the casualties from the direct attack were heavy.

With most of Jiang’s troops focused on Feng, Yan’s army was able to advance and capture Jinan in Shandong in June of 1930.  To make matters worse for Jiang, Li had come out from exile in Hong Kong and then Vietnam and his Guangxi troops were advancing from the south through Hunan towards Wuhan.  Jiang was now facing a three-front campaign.  If Li’s plan of marching north and taking Wuhan succeeded, the rebels would control the major city on the Yangzi, just upriver from the capital of Nanjing.

Li divided his soldiers, perhaps 45,000 to 90,000 in number, into three columns.  Two advanced quickly and experienced little resistance. The third carried siege equipment and was the slowest and considerably back from the first two lines. 

Jiang appointed his subordinate He to command the defence there.  That was the same commander who had successfully pushed Li back from the area the previous year.  He’s troops were outnumbered this time and Jiang ordered him to lure the enemy in deep and look for ways to annihilate Li.  There were provincial troops that could be used too, but the KMT was not sure of their reliability as they had previously sided with Li when he had installed a provincial governor.  He decided a defence of Wuhan would likely fail because of his limited numbers and carefully studied the maps to find the best place to do battle.  He decided on an empty fortress strategy.  He would leave Wuhan undefended.  He ordered the provincial troops not to fall back from the Hunan capital north towards Wuhan, but to advance northwest instead.

This preserved the force and caused the attackers to pause.  Even though the road to Wuhan was open, they hesitated.  They were worried about a trap or about being cut off from the column advancing slowly behind them that had the siege weapons that they planned to use to take Wuhan. 

Meanwhile Jiang was able to reinforce with an additional 10,000 troops by boat up to Wuhan and some additional troops moved from Guangdong by land into southern Hunan.  Those commanders would also later earn a strong reputation for their defence of Shanghai in 1932 from a Japanese attack.  They were now able to get between Li’s northern columns and the slow third column in the south.  This cut Li’s army in two and interrupted its supply line.  Hunan was experiencing a drought so there was limited local food.  Li needed supplies to keep his army fed. 

Li then decided to stop his advance north towards Wuhan and to turn his northern columns around to return south to win back control of his centre.  Now the GMD sensed opportunity and pounced.  He and the provincial troops moved southeast, while Jiang was able to send some gunboats along a river and to spare a few more troops from the east. 

Li was initially successful at pushing back the southern KMT troops, but then the Nationalist forces converged on him, and the Guangxi warlord was forced to retreat west in the direction of his home province.  He lost about 12,000 soldiers (either killed, wounded, or taken prisoner).  This was a crucial victory as it secured the south for the Nationalists, and they were then able to move troops north to reinforce the troops fighting Feng and Yan. 

I want to take a moment to consider The Empty Fort Strategy which was important in the Nationalist win.  This is one of the many military strategies taught in China.  I learned about it listening to an audiobook about Sun Tzu’s The Art of War.  It probably was in the commentaries which scholars have added to the book over the years.  This strategy involves reverse psychology.  In the old story, which has been told a few different ways, a commander’s troops were out foraging, and the remaining troops were caught not being able to defend a fort against attackers.  So, the commander ordered the gate opened and stationed women on the walls to make it look like he had more troops than he did.  The terrain, with a dense forest nearby, and with the defending general having a good reputation, the attacking commander feared an ambush and decided to move back a bit before camping.  By the time he did attack the fort with its gate open, the defender’s foraging troops had returned, and they did ambush the attackers and win.  The key was psychology and unbalancing the attacker. 

In this case, Li was fooled by the empty road to Wuhan.  It made me consider his education.  Any military commander well read in the classics should have known this story.  His father was a schoolteacher, which means the father probably passed the first level examination under the old system.  But Li had come of age around the time the examinations were cancelled and had a military education.  I don’t know if he had learned the classics or not, including the Empty Fort strategy.  In any event, he was confused by his opponent moving his troops northwest.  This was not what he had expected, and it caused him to slow his advance towards Wuhan and to reconsider his plan.  Li was not a poor commander. He had already experienced success in the Northern Expedition, and he would later trap Japanese troops during the second Sino-Japanese war leading to one of China’s strongest victories during that conflict.  But in this instance, he was outplayed by a numerically inferior opponent. 

As a result of Li’s defeat, Jiang was able to transfer troops from the Wuhan area to Shandong.  In early August 1930, Chiang’s forces approached Jinan.  Yan urged Feng to attack the Nationalists from the west to split the Nationalist forces and to relieve pressure on Yan.  Feng did so and 20 divisions of Feng’s advanced east through Henan towards Jiangsu.  This August offensive was during a period of intense rains and the muddy ground may have helped the defenders.  It made it tougher for Feng’s soldiers to maneuver and slowed movement of supplies.    The Nationalists held their ground and followed Chiang’s orders to fight to the death.  Eventually, after approximately a week, Feng gave up.  About five days later, the Nationalist forces in Shandong were able to push and recapture Jinan, forcing back Yan’s troops.  The Guomindang had survived the three-front war.  First by winning in the south, then by moving troops from there to the north.  Then they first held off the strongest opponent before recapturing the city from the weaker opponent.  Over the following two weeks, Chiang’s side continued to press and pushed the rebels further back towards the west.  He was clearly in the dominant position.  Only now did Zhang Xueliang, the Young Marshal in Manchuria, end his neutrality and confirm his loyalty to Chiang Kai-shek.  He joined Chiang by moving his troops south of the Great Wall.  This was the icing on the cake for Nanjing and led Yan to retreat to his home province of Shanxi.  Feng wanted to continue fighting, but some of his subcommanders defected.  Chiang was able to take Kaifeng, Zhengzhou and Xian by October. 

This has been called the War of the Central Plains.  It was the last big campaign among the Chinese warlords. It could be called the final chapter of the Northern Expedition.  It was a fight for supremacy between the warlords and Chiang Kai-shek.  Over one million soldiers took part.  There were perhaps four times as many casualties in this war as during the Northern Expedition.  Probably between 200,000 and 300,000 soldiers were lost between deaths, injuries and captures.  Chiang and his commanders defeated all enemies, first individually and then collectively.  Nanjing was firmly in control.  But it still faced a decentralized country with provincial and regional armies.  But now, none of them were willing to openly challenge Jiang’s leadership or take up arms against him.  They stayed in their areas and didn’t challenge Jiang.  This was acceptable to Chiang Kai-shek as he had other issues to address.  One was the Communists who did openly oppose him and the other challenge, which grew over time, was Japan.

I wanted to add a quick note on sources, since I am sometimes asked about them. I have published a note here that lists my literary sources (the books and scholarly articles I have read and used to create this content), as well as my image sources (which I use for the photos here and for my YouTube episodes about these topics.)

For this Nanjing period, I’ve done a lot of reading tackling the subject from different angles.  The Communist perspective as told by Communists.  A look at Mao from an anti-communist born on the mainland.  A look at Chiang Kai-shek as told by the KMT.  A look at his opponents and critics within and outside the Nationalist party.   Articles on those who came close to ousting him early on and paid with their lives.  I read a rather detailed book at KMT’s troubled relationship with bankers and business owners from 1927-1937.  It was eye opening.  I also read books and articles from different time periods.  I’ve read about the Nanjing government from articles and books written in the late 1920s, in the 1930s, during the 60s and 70s and some more recent ones as more archive material has become available. I’ve also read books both by Mao Zedong and by Chiang Kai shek.

Early topics like the weakness of the Qing were just setting the stage.  If you want more details about which sources I used for a particular episode or how I came to a given perspective, you’re welcome to message me. I also have two posts here on Substack labeled sources. One is for literary sources (like books and journal articles). The other is for the open source pictures I use. Thank you.

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